Isotta Nogarola (1417-1461/8), perhaps the most famous and accomplished learned woman of the century, studied Latin and Greek at an early age. Her tutor, Martino Rizzoni, was a pupil of one of the greatest humanist teachers of the Quarttrocento, Guarino of Verona (1374-1460). At the age of eighteen, using her tutor's contacts and hoping to become a humanist in her own right, Nogarola entered into correspondence with a number of the leading humanists of her age.

      Although her work was praised, the praise given to her was always couched in terms of how she excelled other women. She was not praised as being the equal to men. Further, many suggested that if she wished to pursue her goal, she would have to become a man. There was no place in humanism for a woman. After two years, Nogarola stopped writing.

      However, she did not give up her passion for knowledge. In stark contrast to the norms of her time, Isotta neither took religious vows nor married. Instead, in 1441, she returned to Verona to live with her mother, devoting her self to her religious studies for the next twenty-five years. The price Nogarola paid for her intellectual freedom was high: perpetual virginity and isolation from other learned people.

      From 1451 to 1453, her isolation was broken through her correspondence with Ludovico Foscarini, a Venetian nobleman and humanist. Her most important writing comes from with period. In a series of letters, Nogarola and Foscarini debated the relative guilt of Adam and Eve in the cause of the Fall with Foscarini defending Adam and Nogarola defending Eve. Both sides of the debate were reprinted in Her Immaculate Hand: Selected Works by and About The Women Humanists of Quattrocento Italy by Margaret L. King and Albert Rabil, Jr. Only Nogarola's arguments will be summarized and/or reproduced here. Nogarola quotes several highly respected theologians, including Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, Isidore, and Peter Lombard, to buttress her arguments. Foscarini begins and ends the debate.

      In her first letter in this series to Foscarini, Nogarola makes the following points:

1. Eve sinned out of inconstancy and ignorance while Adam sinned from a position of strength and knowledge. Therefore Eve sinned less than Adam.
2. God commanded Adam alone, using the singular form of the word for you, not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
3. Eve did not eat the forbidden fruit because she wanted to be like God, but because she wanted to indulge in pleasure; a much less serious sin. If Adam had not eaten the fruit, her sin would have had no consequence. She harmed only herself, and not her posterity, by indulging in the delights of paradise.
4. Eve was given a lighter punishment than Adam. Her punishment consisted of pain during childbirth which lasts but a short time while Adam's punishment is to toil daily for his bread. Again, Nogarola notes that God used the singular form for the word for you when He [sic] says to Adam, "Cursed be the ground because of you; in toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life."

      In her second letter, she iterates some points made earlier, yields some points, rebuts Ludovicio's arguments, and presents new arguments when she makes the following points:

1. Stressing an earlier argument by repeating and expanding it, Nogarola claims that Eve sinned from ignorance, ignorance that is part of her nature and implanted in her by God. To the contrary, Adam, being God's perfect creation, "having greater understanding and knowledge of truth as well as a greater depth of wisdom," having greater responsibility for God's lesser creatures, and being given more authority, sinned more than Eve.
2. Conceding a previous point, Nogarola now claims that Eve ate the forbidden fruit to gain the knowledge of good and evil, a worthy goal, and a much less serious transgression than disobeying a command of God.
3. Adding new arguments, Nogarola notes that women, as well as men, were redeemed by Jesus because woman's sin was much less than man's.
4. Buttressing another new argument by appealing to established authorities, Nogarola quotes several theologians who state in various ways that "what Adam lost Christ restored" not "what Eve lost" or "what Adam and Eve lost" but "what Adam lost" implying that Adam's transgression, not Eve's transgression or their transgressions, was what necessitated a redeemer.
5. Inserting another new point, Nogarola states that Adam either had free will or he did not. If Adam had free will, then Eve could not force Adam to sin and he must bear the responsibility for his own sin. If Adam did not have free will, that God is the cause of the sin, absolving Eve.
6. Conceding a point to convention, Nogarola admits that Eve, weak and ignorant by nature, was seduced by the serpent which was called "wise." Adam, "created by God with perfect knowledge," was persuaded by the voice of the imperfect woman.
7. Rebutting one of Ludovico's arguments, Nogarola remarks that it is irrelevant that Eve was in sin longer than Adam because they are not equals. Adam is superior to Eve, hence more is expected of him and his transgressions were much greater than hers.

      Although Nogarola at times argues from the weak position that women are inherently inferior to men, her defense of Eve when viewed as a whole is really quite strong. Indeed, at times, she seems to be conceding Eve's weakness only to satirically point out Adam's alleged strength. But judge for yourself.

      From Isotta's first letter to Ludovico:

      " But I see things - since you move me to reply - from quite another and contrary viewpoint. For where there is less intellect and less constancy, there there is less sin; and Eve [lacked sense and constancy] and therefore sinned less. Knowing [her weakness] that crafty serpent began by tempting the woman, thinking the man perhaps invulnerable because of his constancy. [For it says in ] Sentences 2: Standing in the woman's presence, the ancient foe did not boldly persuade, but approached her with a question: "Why did God bid you not to eat of the tree of paradise?" She responded: "Lest perhaps we die." But seeing that she doubted the words of the Lord, the devil said: "You shall not die," but "you will be like god, knowing good from evil."

      [Adam must also be judged more guilty than Eve, secondly] because of his greater contempt for the command. For in Genesis 2 it appears that the Lord commanded Adam, not Eve, where it says: "The Lord God took the man and placed him in the paradise of Eden to till it and to keep it ," (and it does not say, "that they might care for and protect it") ". . . and the Lord God commanded the man" (and not "them"): "From every tree of the garden you may eat" (and not "you" [in the plural sense]), and [referring to the forbidden tree], "for the day you eat of it, you must die," [again, using the singular form of man more highly than the woman.

      Moreover, the woman did not [eat from the forbidden tree] because she believed that she was made more like God, but rather because she was weak and [inclined to indulge in] pleasure. Thus: "Now the woman saw that the tree was good for food, pleasing to the eyes, and desirable for the knowledge it would give. She took of its fruit and ate it, and also gave some to her husband and he ate," and it does not say [that she did so] in order to be like God. And if Adam had not eaten, her sin would have had no consequences. For it does not say: "If Eve had not sinned Christ would not have been made incarnate," but "If Adam had not sinned." Hence the woman, but only because she had been first deceived by the serpent's evil persuasion, did indulge in the delights of paradise; but she would have harmed only herself and in no way endangered human posterity if the consent of the first-born man had not been offered. Therefore Eve was no danger to posterity but [only] to herself; but the man Adam spread the infection of sin to himself and to all future generations. Thus Adam, being the author of all humans yet to be born, was also the first cause of perdition. For this reason the healing of humankind was celebrated first in the man and then in the woman, just as [according to Jewish tradition], after an unclean spirit has been expelled from a man, as it springs forth from the synagogue, the woman is purged [as well].

      Moreover, that Eve was condemned by a just judge to a harsher punishment is evidently false, for God said to the woman: "I will make great your distress in childbearing; in pain shall you bring forth children; for your husband shall be your longing, though he have dominion over you." But to Adam he said: "Because you have listened to your wife and have eaten of the tree of which I have commanded you not to eat" (notice that God appears to have admonished Adam alone [using the singular form of "you"] and not Eve) "Cursed be the ground because of you; in toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the plants of the ground, since out of it you were taken; for dust you are and unto dust you shall return." Notice that Adam's punishment appears harsher than Eve's for God said to Adam: "to dust you shall return," and not to Eve, and death is the most terrible punishment that could be assigned. Therefore it is established that Adam's punishment was greater than Eve's.

      I have written this because you wished me to. yet I have done so fearfully, since this is not a woman's task. But you are kind, and if you find any part of my writing clumsy you will correct it." p 58-61

      From Isotta's second letter to Ludovico:

      "I had decided that I would not enter further into a contest with you because, as you say, you assault my fortress with my own weapons. [The propositions] you have presented me were so perfectly and diligently defended that it would be difficult not merely for me, but for the most learned men, to oppose them. But since I recognize that his contest is useful for me, I have decided to obey your honest with. Even though I know I struggle in vain, yet I will earn the highest praise if I am defeated by so mighty a man as you.

      Eve sinned out of ignorance and inconstancy, and hence you contend that she sinned more gravely, because the ignorance of those things which we are obligated to know does not excuse us, since it is written: "He who does not know will not be known." I would concede your point if that ignorance were crude or affected. But Eve's ignorance was implanted by nature, of which nature God himself is the author and founder. In many people it is seen that he who knows less sins less, like a boy sins less than an old man or a peasant less than a noble. such a person does not need to know explicitly what is required for salvation, but simplicity, because [for him] faith alone suffices. The question of inconstancy proceeds similarly. for when it is said that the acts which proceed from inconstancy are more blameworthy, [that kind of] inconstancy is understood which is not innate but the product of character and sins.

      The same is true of imperfection. For when gifts increase, greater responsibility is imposed. When God created man, form the beginning he created him perfect, and the powers of his soul perfect, and gave him a greater depth of wisdom. Thus it was that the Lord led to Adam all the animals of the earth and the birds of heaven, so that Adam could call them by their names. For God said, "Let us make mankind in our image and likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the birds of the air, the cattle, over all the wild animals and every creature that crawls on the earth," making clear his own perfection. But of the woman he said: "It is not good that the man is alone. I will make him a helper like himself." And since consolation and joy are requirements for happiness, and since no one can have solace and joy when alone, it appears that God created woman for man's consolation. For the good spreads itself, and the greater it is the more it shares itself. Therefore, it appears that Adam's sin was greater than Eve's. [As] Ambrose [says]: "In him to whom a more indulgent liberality has been shown is insolence more inexcusable."

      "But Adam's companion," [you argue], "is not excused because Adam was appointed to protect her, because thieves who have been trustingly employed by a householder are not punished with the most severe punishment like strangers or those in whom the householder placed no confidence." This is true, however, in temporal law, but not in divine law, for divine justice proceeds differently from temporal justice in punishing [sin.}

      [You argue further that] "the fragility of the woman was not the cause of sin, but rather her inordinate appetite for seeking that which was not suited to her nature," which [appetite] is the product, as you write, of pride. Yet it is clearly less a sin to desire the knowledge of good and evil than to transgress against a divine commandment, since the desire for knowledge is a natural thing, and all men by nature desire to know. And even if the first impulse of sin] were this inordinate appetite, which cannot be without sin, yet it is more tolerable than the sin of transgression, for the observance of the commandments is the road which leads to the country of salvation. [It is written]: "But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments;" and likewise: "What shall I do to gain eternal life? Keep the commandments." And transgression is particularly born of pride, because pride is nothing other than rebellion against divine rule, exalting oneself above what is permitted according to divine rule, by disdaining the will of God and displacing it with one's own. Thus Augustine [writes] in On nature and Grace: "Sin is the will to pursue or retain what justice forbids, that is, to deny what God wishes." Ambrose agrees with in his On Paradise: "Sin is the transgression against divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments." Behold! See that the transgression against and disobedience to the heavenly commandments is the greatest sin, whereas you have thus defined sin: "Sin is the inordinate desire to know." Thus clearly the sin of transgression against a command is greater than [the sin of] desiring the knowledge of good and evil. so even if inordinate desire be a sin, as with Eve, yet she did not desire to be like God in power but only in the knowledge of good and evil, which by nature she was actually inclined to desire.

      [Next, as to your statement] that those words, "if Adam had not sinned," confirm you in your view [of Eve's damnability], since Eve may have so sinned that, like the demons, she did not merit redemption, I reply that she also was redeemed with Adam, because [she was] "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh." And if it seems that God did not redeem her, this was undoubtedly because God held her sin as negligible. For if man deserved redemption, the woman deserved it much more because of the slightness of the crime. For the angel cannot be excused by ignorance as can the woman. For the angel understands without investigation or discussion and has an intellect more in the likeness of God's - to which it seems Eve desired to be similar - than does man. hence the angel is called intellectual and the man rational. Thus where the woman sinned from her desire for knowledge, the angel sinned from a desire for power. While knowledge of an appearance in some small can be partaken of by the creature, in no way can it partake in the power of God and of the soul of Christ. Moreover, the woman in sinning thought she would receive mercy, believing certainly that she was committing a sin, but not one so great as to warrant God's inflicting such a sentence and punishment. But the angel did not think [of mercy]. Hence Gregory [says in the] fourth book of the Moralia: "The first parents were needed for this, that the sin which they committed by transgressing they might purge by confessing." But that persuasive serpent was never punished for his sin, for he was never to be recalled to grace. Thus, in sum, Eve clearly merited redemption more than the angels.

      [As to your argument] that the woman also suffers all the penalties inflicted on the man, and beyond those which are common [to both] she alone gives birth in sorrow and has been subjected to man, this also reinforces my earlier point. As I said, the good spreads itself, and the greater it is the more it shares itself. So also evil, the greater it is the more it shares itself, and the more it shares itself the more harmful it is, and the more harmful it is the greater it is. Furthermore, the severity of the punishment is proportional to the gravity of the sin. Hence Christ chose to die on the cross, though this was the most shameful and horrible kind of death, and on the cross he endured in general every kind of suffering by type. Hence Isidore writes concerning the Trinity: "The only-born Son of God in executing the sacrament of his death, in himself bears witness that he consummated every kind of suffering when, with lowered head, he gave up his spirit." the reason was that the punishment had to correspond to the guilt. Adam took the fruit of the forbidden tree; Christ suffered on the tree and so mad satisfaction [for Adam's sin]. [As] Augustine [writes]: "Adam disdained God's command" (and he does not say Eve) "accepting the fruit from the tree, but whatever Adam lost Christ restored." [For Christ paid the penalty for sin he had not committed, as it says in] Psalm 64: "For what I have not taken, then I atoned." Therefore, Adam's sin was the greatest [possible], because the punishment corresponding to his fault was the greatest [possible] and was general in all men. {As the] apostle [says]: "All sinned in Adam."

      "Eve," [you say], "must bear responsibility for every fault of Adam because as Aristotle shows, whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the thing caused." This is true in the case of things which are, as you know better [than I], in themselves the causes of other things, which is the case for the first cause, the first principle, and "that on account of which anything is what it is." But clearly this was not the case with Eve, because Adam either had free will or he did not. If he did not have it, he did not sin; if he had it, then Eve forced the sin [upon him], which is impossible. For a Bernard says, "Free will, because of its inborn nobility, is forced by no necessity," not even by God, because it that were the case it would be to concede that two contradictories are true at the same time. God cannot do, therefore, what would cause an act proceeding from free will and remaining free to be not free but coerced. [As] Augustine [writes in his commentary] on Genesis: "God cannot act against that nature which he created with good will." God could himself, however, remove that condition of liberty from any person and bestow some other conditions on him. In the same way fire cannot, while it remains fire, not burn, unless its nature is changed and suspended for a time by divine force. No other creature, such as a good angel or devil can do this, since they are less than God; much less a woman, since she is less perfect and weaker than they . Augustine clarifies this principle [of God's supremacy] saying: "Above our mind is nothing besides God, nor is there anything intermediary between God and our mind." Yet only something which is superior to something else can coerce it; but Eve was inferior to Adam, therefore she was not herself the cause of sin. [In] Ecclesiasticus 15 [it says]: "God from the beginning created man and placed him in the palm of his counsel and made clear his commandments and precepts. If you wish to preserve the commandments, they will preserve you and create in you pleasing faith." Thus Adam appeared to accuse God rather than excuse himself when he said: "Thus Adam appeared to accuse God rather than excuse himself when he said: "The woman you placed at my side gave me fruit from the tree and I ate it."

      [Next you argue] that the beloved companion could have more easily deceived the man than the shameful serpent the woman. To this I reply that Eve, weak and ignorant by nature, sinned much less by assenting to that astute serpent, who was called "wise," than Adam - created by God with perfect knowledge and understanding - in listening to the persuasive words and voice of the imperfect woman.

      [Further, you say] that Eve persevered in her sin a longer time and therefore sinned more, because crimes are that much more serious according to the length of time they hold the unhappy soul in bondage. This is no doubt true, when two sins are equal, and in the same person or in two similar persons. But Adam and Eve were not equals, because Adam was a perfect animal and Eve imperfect and ignorant. {Therefore, their sins were not comparable, and Eve who persevered longer in sin, was not on that account more guilty than Adam].

      Finally, if I may quote you: "The woman was the example and the cause of sin, and Gregory emphatically extends the burden of guilt to [the person who provided] an example, and Christ condemned the cause of the ignorant Jews, because it was first, more than the learned Pilate's sentence when he said: "Therefore he who betrayed me to you has greater sin." I reply that Christ did not condemn the cause of the ignorant Jews because it was first, but because it was vicious and devilish due to their native malice and obstinacy. For they did not sin from ignorance. The gentile Pilate was more ignorant about these things than the Jews, who had the law and the prophets and read them and daily saw signs concerning [Christ]. For John 15 says: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin. But now they have no excuses for their sin." Thus they themselves said: "What are we doing? for this man is working signs." And: "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed One?" For the [Jewish] people was special to God, and Christ himself [said]: "I was not sent except to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. It is not fair to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs." therefore the Jews sinned more, because Jesus loved them more.

      Let these words be enough from me, an unarmed and poor little woman." page 63 - 67

      Margaret L. King and Albert Rabil, Jr., Her Immaculate Hand: Selected Works by and About The Women Humanists of Quattrocento Italy, Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, Binghamtom, NY pages p 59 - 67

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